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This paper is informed by the following guidelines from the sponsors
of the Lowenstein Symposium:
The focus. . . will be the claim advanced by nation-states that threats
to their particular security necessitate and justify the curtailment of fun-
damental freedoms and liberties of the individual person within the na-
tional domain. We request that panelists address their remarks
specifically to questions such as:
What are the contending claims made by state officials and individuals
and the attendant circumstances?
What are the underlying policy justifications for derogations?
What, in such situations, constitutes a violation or deprivation of
human rights?
What, until now, has been the international community's approach to
the analysis and resolution of state security and human rights claims?
What ought the appropriate response to the international community
be?
Reflections on this assignment persuaded me that these five specific
questions are based on certain general, yet undeclared assumptions,
and that it would therefore be impossible to deal with them without
first examining the underlying matrix. These critical underlying as-
sumptions are the following:
1. We live in a "system of independent nation-states."
2. This political system coexists with, or is identical to an "interna-
tional community." (The relation between these two intellectual con-
structions is not made clear.)
3. Both systems are world-wide in scope.
4. Each is morally unified in the sense that politically relevant
thoughts and actions are presumed to issue from shared values.
5. States, other political actors, and individuals are therefore sub-
ject to the same laws and norms, among them specifically those which
concern on the one hand civil liberties, and on the other human rights.
(The relation between these two clusters of concepts is not spelled out.)
6. Violations or derogations of civil liberties or of human rights are
properly analyzed, judged, and resolved by the "international commu-
t Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Sarah Lawrence College.
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nity," as are all conflicts between claims to state security and claims to
human rights.
The first sections of the paper discuss these assumptions, with em-
phasis on the ambiguities in the relationships between the "interna-
tional community" and the "system of nation-states," and between
human rights and civil liberties. The paper then examines the policy
relevance of the ideas here in play, focusing on considerations of state
security, specifically as they affect the cause of civil liberties and polit-
ical freedoms. The concluding sections concern the national security
and human rights policies of the United States.
I. The "International Community" and Human Rights
The key concepts in the assumptions under discussion are obviously
the international community and human rights-not the sovereign
state and not the individual concerned with civil liberties. The assump-
tions imply that the international community determines whether, and
if so which, derogations of human rights have occurred, how contend-
ing claims of state and citizen are to be resolved, and what comprises a
given nation's security interest. In other words, the international com-
munity is cast in the role of judge when the nature of a state's domestic
public order and an individual's destiny in that state are at issue.
What, then, is this international community? Does it really exist?
The symposium's instructions do not supply a definition, but they sug-
gest that the term is interchangeable with the phrase "the international
state system," and that both formulations are embodied in the United
Nations.
No one today can deny the existence of an international state system.
What is questionable is the claim that this system is also a morally or
culturally unified international community, and that it therefore out-
ranks the sovereign state within the latter's domestic jurisdiction. This
claim overlooks the basic norms of the international order of states,
international law, and the United Nations Charter, all of which posit
the opposite, namely, respect for state sovereignty in matters of domes-
tic jurisdiction. We are thus not dealing with international legislative,
executive, and judicial agencies that are qualified or empowered to reg-
ulate relations between the state and its citizenry. The logic of the in-
ternational scheme requires instead that states evolve their own forms
of government. It also suggests that the world's governments are more
likely to differ from each other than to converge on one particular
model.
This truth is fully borne out by the records of history, which tell us
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that political systems have come and gone in all provinces of the world.
Some arose in morally unified communities or proved able to generate
a moral consensus; others, by contrast, existed as plural or multicul-
tural societies without reliance on shared norms and values. All polit-
ical systems have been concerned with "security" in their public orders.
However, and diverse as the quests were, the records tell us that "secur-
ity" is an elusive goal everywhere, in great empires and common-
wealths as well as in small folk societies, city-states, and nation-states.
Throughout time, then, "security" has been in short supply for genera-
tions of human beings, whatever their political habitat and status in
society.
This widely shared predicament in matters of administering human
destinies within geographically or culturally bounded space, in con-
junction with technically limited means of communication and general
ignorance of distant lands and peoples, explains why no attempt was
made throughout much of recorded history to cast the twin concepts of
the inhabited world and of mankind into politically concrete organiza-
tional forms. The revolutionary turn was made only in the middle of
the twentieth century by the extension of Europe's so-called modern
states system to human societies everywhere.
II. The Individual and the State
The original characteristics of the modem state system are well
known today. They were set out lucidly in the seventeenth century by
Hugo Grotius in his De Jure Belli ac Pacis of 1625, as well as by the
treaties of Westphalia which concluded the Thirty Years' War. What
must be recalled today is that the system grew from a culturally shared
value system anchored in the Christian faith, Greco-Roman legacies of
secular law and government, and certain norms of inter-personal and
public association to which European peoples north of the Alps consist-
ently had subscribed. Refined by medieval and early modern theory
and experience, these traditions converge on the following basic under-
standings of the nature of the individual and the state, and of the rela-
tion between the two.
The individual is conceived as an essentially autonomous person.
Because his mind is recognized as the exclusive source of thought, he is
presumed capable of entering into obligations, acquiring rights, and of
committing himself voluntarily in association with others. The per-
son-not a group of persons-is thus the primary legal concept in the
West. It follows that persons are equal in the context of law, however
unequal they may be in other contexts of life.
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The state too is viewed as a creature of law, more particularly of
contract law. It could thus be defined in classical Rome as "a partner-
ship in law" and in eighteenth century England as a compact between
successive generations meant to endure through time. According to
this view of the state, men are meant to function as citizens, not as
subjects doing the bidding of those who happen to hold power, and not
merely as private persons following callings of their choice. Further,
being citizens, men have civil liberties, including the rights to freedom
of thought and speech and to due process of law, as well as civil obliga-
tions; these liberties, again, imply the political right to participate di-
rectly or indirectly in the governance of the state.
The ideas here in play did not immediately appear in fully institu-
tionalized forms. The time was not ripe for parliaments in England till
there was a fairly settled, strong, and regular system of order and jus-
tice in the land.' The histories of Europe's civil law countries record
comparable findings that men must possess a deep law-abiding disposi-
tion before representative government can be expected to work.
The early convergence of Europe's diverse societies on the rule of
secular law as the superior norm-setting reference for political organi-
zation and conflict resolution had lent moral unity to the cultural sub-
stratum upon which the new design for the ordering of international
relations came to rest after the seventeenth century. In other words, the
political system of independent states, each sovereign in its own territo-
rial contours, was also an "international community." In light of this
linkage it was both logical and necessary that conflicts between govern-
ment and citizenry be viewed as matters of domestic jurisdiction.2
This entire concept of the law-directed state, more particularly as de-
veloped in the English common law, was carried to North America by
English colonists. Their war for independence from England was
fought in behalf of the civil liberties that had been their birthrights as
English citizens; following their victory they established these freedoms
firmly in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights of the United States.
It is possible to distinguish two phases in the subsequent extension of
the modern state system to the world at large. The first began about the
middle of the nineteenth century and was marked by the inclusion of
several independent Asian polities, among them the empires of the Ot-
1. See A. GOODHART, LAW OF THE LAND (1966).
2. See generally Bozeman, On the Relevance of Hugo Grotius and De Jure Belli ac Pacis
for Our Times, 1 GROTIANA 65 (1980); A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICUL-
TURAL WORLD 34-49 (1971); A. BOZEMAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL
HISTORY 57-130 (Greece), 162-215 (Rome), 238-356 (Byzantium and Medieval Europe)
(1960).
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toman Turks, the Chinese, the Japanese, and the Kingdom of Siam.
All were themselves long established political systems as well as mor-
ally unified communities, and all were firmly rooted in belief and value
systems different from those underlying the European scheme.
These differences were fully recognized in the East and the West.
Yet, the new alignment stimulated intricate borrowing processes,
mainly in the context of law, in which Western constitutions and bills
of rights were carefully examined and compared by Asian elites before
decisions were made to graft appropriate concepts upon existing tradi-
tional institutions. In short, radical transformations of internal social
structures generally were not intended, which helps to explain why the
new frame of reference was esteemed mainly if not exclusively as the
superstructure in the management of "new" international relations.
Respect for domestic jurisdiction could thus remain the norm in Asia
as in the homeland of the European prototypes of the modem state
system, albeit with the difference that in Asia there was no organic
nexus between globally valid and locally valid forms.
The second phase in the Westernization process commenced after
World War I when India won quasi-recognition as a member of the
international system. It reached its climax after World War II in the
era of decolonization and the establishment of the United Nations,
when state-making degenerated into a mechanical transaction, and
when non-Western and Communist states old and new donned West-
er-type constitutions and bills of rights.
It was on the basis of this paperwork that approximately 100 states
suddenly qualified as democracies, even though their respective socie-
ties had been and continued to be based on principles of administration
very different from those implicit in their new appellation, that most
were instantly admitted to the United Nations on the basis of such
newly acquired credentials, and that the United Nations itself could
purport to be a legally and morally unified international community as
well as a globe-spanning state system.
III. Global Realities and the American Perception of Human
Rights
The reality behind these appearances was and is wholly different.
Not only is there no global consensus for determining the proper rela-
tionship between government and people, but despotisms far outnum-
ber democracies today. This means that there is not even a voting
majority in the modem society of states to support the twin notions of
the individual as an autonomous person and a citizen. Indeed, as com-
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munalism in one form or another eclipses individualism, and as au-
thoritarianism prevails over freedom, the cause of civil liberties and
political freedoms seems out of place and doomed, the very words
eliminated from international discourse by torrents of references to
human rights. How, then, can one argue that the international system
is a unified community, or that this system, acting through absolute
majorities of despotisms, is or ought to be, in charge of "analyzing,
judging and resolving conflicts between claims to state security and
claims to human rights," as the symposium guidelines assume?
This brings us to the second question we were asked to address:
what are "human rights"? In this phrase a synonym for civil liberties
and political freedoms? Does it cancel and replace these democratic
concepts, or is it designed to subsume them? If the latter, should the
two concepts be allowed to become confounded?
History and etymology teach us that we are dealing with two differ-
ent but interacting sets of ideas, both of which originated in the West,
albeit in different intellectual contexts.
"Human rights" is a modern constellation of ideas. Yet it is also a
progeny of natural law theories and an evocation of what was known in
classical and early modern European philosophy as the natural rights
of man. The primary subject of these theoretical constructions is hu-
manity or mankind, not the individual human being. Such a focus is
expressly invited by Greek and Latin languages that instruct the mind
to think in universal as well as in particular terms, in marked contrast,
for example, to Chinese which simply cannot render such a notion as
"human rights."' 3 It should not be overlooked, however, that the Occi-
dental concept of the natural rights of man is grounded not in law but
in philosophy. As students of Greek, Roman, and early Christian stoi-
cism, of Hobbes and Locke, and of the Enlightenment well know, the
learned speculated about the law of nature, the state of nature, the pos-
sibility of natural social contracts, and hence about the natural rights of
man. These theories often supplied correctives to positive law and ju-
risprudence, but they were at no time allowed to qualify as law. The
concept of man's natural rights was thus generally viewed by Europe's
jurists as indeterminate, lacking in legal precision, and therefore as in-
capable of providing a reliable measure of what "right" is in a given
situation.4 Neither logic nor experience would therefore have per-
3. Cf. I. RICHARDS, MENCIUS ON THE MIND: EXPERIMENTS IN MULTIPLE DEFINITION
89 (1932) (comparing Mencius' thought to Western tradition of analysis); Chu, The Chinese
Language, in AN INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE CIVILIZATION (J. Meskill ed. 1973).
4. See generally H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY
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suaded law-minded elites to accept "human rights" as a synonym or a
cover for civil rights.
This aspect of the European heritage was not accepted in the United
States. True, successive generations of Americans prized the political
freedoms as well as the civil rights that were theirs by virtue of the
English common law. But they also were fervently convinced that
these rights were not unique to Americans and that they inhered ina-
lienably in human beings everywhere. An eighteenth century spokes-
man for Pennsylvania thus proclaimed that the liberties of
Pennsylvanians were founded on the acknowledged rights of human
nature. Others maintained that no written laws could create liberties,
because all laws were mere declarations of an eternally existing law, of
nature and right reason, if only because the ideal must be presumed to
have existed before the real.. No one spelled out what "the ideal" was,
however, or explained in precisely which ways existing positive rights
were deficient.
Further, and with special reference to the inquiries pursued by this
paper, no critic seriously investigated the presence or absence of
"rights" in mankind's non-Western provinces. Pessimism actually was
voiced about the future of liberty in the world-at-large, as when it was
noted that the rulers of the East were "almost universally absolute tyr-
annies"; that "the states of Africa are scenes of tyranny, barbarity, con-
fusion, and every form of violence"; and that despotism was rising too
in continental Europe where "human nature" had at one time been
highly developed.5 But no one related these impressions to the abstrac-
tions that reigned supreme on the eve of independence. At that time
Americans seem to have agreed with Alexander Hamilton, who wrote
in 1775 that "the sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for
among old parchments or musty records. They are written as with a
sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of divinity
itself .... "6
Americans, then, did not turn to history to confirm their faith in
mankind's rights. Nor did they seriously examine either "nature" or
OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 42-208 (1879); see also 2 J. BRYCE,
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 3-165 (1921).
5. See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 79
(1971) (quoting various colonial newspapers).
6. See id. at 188; see also Bozeman, The Roots of the American Commitment to the Rights
of Man in RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 51-102 (1979) (proceedings of a conference spon-
sored by Center for Study of the American Experience, The Annenberg School of Commu-
nications, University of Southern California) (extended commentary on international,
social, and individual dimensions of rights and responsibilities).
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"human nature" before establishing these references as the source and
sanction of their fundamental beliefs. No one was prepared, therefore,
to acknowledge that "nature" is ruthless and value-neutral, knowing
only birth, reproduction, and death,7 and that there is thus nothing nat-
ural, generally human, or universally valued about freedom of thought,
habeas corpus, the Magna Carta, Roman law, or Aristotle's disquisi-
tions on law, justice, and equity. Rather, each of these recorded phe-
nomena can be understood only as a unique human accomplishment
that is not imitable at will.
The general truth implicit in this European heritage is fully borne
out by the domestic history of the United States, for the nation's judi-
cial records make clear that rights, liberties, and obligations have been
argued carefully in the legal context of the Constitution and the Bill of
Rights, not in the ideological context of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. In the conduct of foreign affairs, however, it is precisely this
ideological frame of reference, replete with untested assumptions about
the place of man in life, that has nurtured and controlled the self-view
of the United States, the perception of other nations, and therewith the
country's general orientation to international relations. No validation
was required for the proposition that all men are born free as well as
equal, or that the pursuit of happiness is an inalienable right. Given
these and related certitudes, it is not surprising that Jeffersonian de-
mocracy was commonly projected as the model governance to all peo-
ples on earth.
One root of this steadfast faith in man's rights and prospects was no
doubt the conviction that Americans are an entirely new kind of peo-
ple, one called upon by "Providence" or "Nature's God" to be "an
asylum," "a lesson," and "a service" to mankind. Another, perhaps
deeper, spring is Christianity, with its demanding order of moral and
social values. This legacy was left by the early European settlers who
actually built the nation, although it was not openly acknowledged in
the eighteenth century climate of official atheism. A third sustaining
source of the American persuasion in foreign affairs appeared in the
late nineteenth century, when the nation began conceiving of itself as
the refuge of the downtrodden from all societies on earth, a melting pot
of races, cultures, and religions, and the land of opportunity for every-
one in search of freedom and material gain.
This new imagery found expression on several levels. In domestic
affairs it gave rise to policies and patterns of immigration that were to
7. See R. DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1976).
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have the ultimate effect of de-Europeanizing the citizenry and its value
system. Further, it accentuated the self-view of Americans as a Re-
deemer Nation and it enhanced the country's confidence that ethnic,
linguistic, and religious differences between human beings in no way
affect the cause of national unity, identity, and security. Transposed to
the field of foreign relations, the imagery suggested that the world at
large was also such a melting pot; here too different cultures and tradi-
tions could be melted down.
Before the outbreak of World War II it was clear that American
thought about international affairs had remained deeply grounded in
the intellectual world of the Declaration of Independence and that the
ambiguities of the nation's dual commitment to civil liberties and natu-
ral or human rights had not been resolved. However, the records of
actual foreign relations show that successive administrations had not
been zealous in activating America's latent missionary impulse. Indeed
neither Theodore Roosevelt's nor Woodrow Wilson's administration
claimed that political fights and civil liberties were universally
applicable.8
Changes in attitude and departures from international custom and
national tradition became apparent toward the end of World War II,
after the United States had become an established world power in in-
ternational affairs. The tone was set by the administration of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt. The State of the Union Message of 1944 thus
included a proposal for "a second Bill of Rights," one that would stress
rights to work, medical care, social security, and education.9 Serious
doubts about the constitutional validity of such a program and about
its relation to the existing bill of civil liberties and political freedoms
were freely voiced in the United States, but they were not to be com-
municated effectively in the United Nations, where Roosevelt's domes-
tic initiative sparked and supported numerous resolutions, covenants,
and declarations in the fields of social, economic, and cultural rights in
the late 1940's.
This poorly controlled interaction between the constitutional order
of the United States and the political systems of other states had a de-
cidedly adverse effect upon the value system, the identity, and hence
the security of the United States. For what had been a blindspot or a
set of mildly vexing incongruities in American national thought and
sentiment suddenly was legitimated through transformation into an in-
8. Bozeman, supra note 6, at 83-97.
9. President Roosevelt's 1944 State of the Union Address, reprinted in N.Y. Times, Jan.
12, 1944, at A12, col. 1.
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ternationally approved norm. The rights complex thus re-entered
American public consciousness and policymaking in this newly hal-
lowed form. Economic rights and group rights were henceforth al-
lowed to outrank individualized constitutional liberties in political
discourse, and the national heritage of values began ceding place to the
convenience of international diplomacy.
The shift in political orientation peaked in the Carter administration.
Its representatives thus announced a "new foreign policy that is demo-
cratic, based on our fundamental values and that uses power and influ-
ence for humane purposes"--one "designed to serve mankind"-and
argued forcefully that the philosophy underlying this new human rights
policy is revolutionary in an intellectual sense because it reflects the
nation's origin and progressive values. 10 Such evocations of the Decla-
ration of Independence were no doubt emotionally satisfying in the
short-range perspective, if only because they provided an easily com-
prehensible link between domestic and foreign affairs. However, they
also had the inevitable long-range effect of contributing to the degener-
ation of once solid, trusted concepts and to the blurring of formerly
distinct categories, meanings, and values, a confusion that was com-
pounded steadily as the term "human rights" became the main rhetori-
cal vehicle for U.S. diplomatic oratory in behalf of the nation's entire
heritage and value system.
Reflections on this shift in American orientation and policymaking
lead to the conclusion that the nation's latest generations may have
taken too many liberties with the ideas of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence. This great document was not conceived as the quintessential
blueprint for the conduct of world-spanning international relations.
Rather, it was drafted carefully by American statesmen of European
descent for the purpose of justifying the fight for independence from a
European mother country. Not surprisingly, it did so under the influ-
ence of Europe's eighteenth century philosophy of enlightenment.
That is to say, the Revolutionary War was an intra-European conflict,
fought and resolved in a value language peculiar to Western civiliza-
tion. The Declaration's relevance for decision-making in foreign policy
should therefore be viewed as strictly limited.
In addition to this global extension of the principles of the Declara-
tion of Independence, another major factor that has conduced to deep
conceptual confusion in our times is Marxism, an ideology that stands
10. See Bozeman, supra note 6, at 95-102 (bibliographical references and comments on
the Carter administration's approach to human rights).
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in open opposition to the beliefs incorporated in the Declaration of In-
dependence, the Constitution, and the history of the United States.
Marxism uncompromisingly stresses economic materialism and
determinism, not the force of ideas and not individual initiative and
willingness to take risks. It explains all thought as the derivative of
historically dominant methods of production and hence as the expres-
sion of an economically dominant class of people. In our era, the doc-
trine holds, human destiny is and will be controlled by the capitalist
class until the proletariat or working class ascends to power.
The individual and his "rights"-whether as an autonomous person
or a citizen-are thus irrelevant conceptions in this version of society
and history. In fact, no intrinsic sustained validity can be ascribed
either to law in general or to the state, since both are understood as
essentially predatory devices serving the interests of the dominant class.
However-and here Marxism becomes a creed of salvation-both insti-
tutions are destined by history to wither away as the class struggle
comes to an end with the victory of the world's working class and the
establishment of a classless, stateless, lawless, and hence morally uni-
fied world society.
This ideology, which lay dormant in the West until it was activated
politically in Russia's Bolshevik revolution, is widely accepted today by
intellectual elites either in its authentic Marxist version or in that fash-
ioned by Lenin, Trotzky, and such lesser modem followers of Marx as
Marcuse and Lukdsz. Annual surveys of publications indicate a steady
proliferation of Marxist studies, not only in the social sciences and eco-
nomics, but also in history, theology, literature, and the arts. This fact,
in conjunction with the striking prominence of Marxist orientations in
the curricula of the West's institutions of learning, helps explain why
economic determinism and scientific materialism are widely trusted as
guidelines for thought and action among educated citizens, whereas
confidence in the principle of individuation and the force of ideas is
gradually receding." Civil and political liberties, being corollaries of
individualism and constitutionalism, slide into irrelevance, while atten-
tion turns methodically to the economic and social interests of special
human groups or classes and to concern for mankind as a whole.
The shift of accent in so much of present-day American thinking
about rights would probably not have been as decisive as it has proved
to be had it not been for an important mood change in the social sci-
11. See Beichman, Karl Marx Goes to College, Wall St. J., May 14, 1982, at 24, col. 4;
Lewy, Academic Ethics and the Radical Left, 19 POL. REV. 29 (1982).
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ences. This revisionist intellectual trend, which is not necessarily re-
lated to Marxism, expresses itself in the desire to construct theories,
models, and standards of human perception, motivation, or behavior
for which universal validity can be claimed. The basic challenge-in
stark contrast to scholarship in the natural sciences with which many
social scientists claim affnities--consists of finding verbal covers for
values, concepts, and institutions that are sufficiently loose to encom-
pass a maximum number of similar phenomena.
This search for sameness and unity in theory has resulted in a level-
ling of genuine differences between cultures, societies, and individual
human beings. A misrepresentation of the real world has thus received
sanction mainly because scholars deliberately neglected modes of ob-
servation and analysis typical of the humanities, among them lan-
guages, religion, philosophy, law, and above all history, which instruct
the mind to be alert to what is particular about a given human situa-
tion. Serious comparative studies cannot be conducted in such circum-
stances, yet such studies should have been completed before we began
professing certainty about the rights which all men everywhere share
today. It is true that meaningful comparisons of different European
and North American systems of law and government have been and
are being made. But this is so because social scientists and lawyers
working in this field are entitled to take the shared Western legal cul-
ture for granted, consciously or unconsciously. Problems arise when
they leave familiar territory and enter culturally alien ground.
The language of constitutionalism and civil liberties successfully has
been installed in each of the approximately 120 despotisms that are
member states of the United Nations today, but it speaks in counter-
point to the local realities of rule and right. The custodians of the na-
tion's language, among them social scientists and lawyers, should have
recognized long ago that our vocabularies are not adequate mirrors of
Islamic law, Chinese law, or African customary law, and that we are
therefore in no way equipped to say which rights the foreign law vests
in the condition of being "man."
This is one of many enduring lessons taught by Sir Henry Maine in
his discourse on the early history of contract, the indispensable root of
constitutionalism and of civil rights:
The favourite occupation of active minds at the present moment, and the
one which answers to the speculations of our forefathers on the origin of
the social state, is the analysis of society as it exists and moves before our
eyes; but, through omitting to call in the assistance of history, this analysis
too often degenerates into an idle exercise of curiosity, and is especially
apt to incapacitate the inquirer for comprehending states of society which
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differ considerably from that to which he is accustomed.' 2
Turning to the domain of jurisprudence, Maine illustrated the point by
taking light issue with Montesquieu's statement that the Troglodytes
were a people who systematically violated their contracts, and so per-
ished utterly. In fact, Maine noted, "the Troglodytes have flourished
and founded powerful states with very small attention to the obligation
of contract."13
The problem presented by the Troglodytes has continued to confront
scholars as well as statesmen in the last centuries; all have had to deal
routinely with accomplished polities in which no trace of constitution-
alism can be detected. The general situation is the same today, but its
challenge is more explicit due to our close coexistence with solidly en-
trenched, expansionist totalitarian systems in the Orient and Eurasia
and with a multiplicity of new, small, politically weak states. However,
and as noted earlier, all states, regardless of their differences, are offi-
cially equalized by virtue of the West's now internationalized constitu-
tional code.
This farflung and complex development in world affairs may have
been too unexpected and abrupt to arouse critical analytical thought in
the ranks of our custodial intellectual elites. Combined with eagerness
to make coexistence work, and above all with the dramatic revival of a
near absolute trust in the creed announced by the Declaration of Inde-
pendence as elaborated by modern social science, it probably accounts
for the swiftness with which the flag of "human rights" was hoisted and
that of "civil liberties and political freedoms" lowered. Academic law-
yers did not offer much resistance to this substitution, at least not when
addressing it in the context of foreign relations. Oddly but fortunately
they have remained steadfast in their respect for the integrity of legal
concepts and terms when dealing with the question of rights in domes-
tic affairs.
The human rights net in which thought and foreign policy making
are now caught has in this way come to shelter the most fanciful of
propositions. Because "society," not the individual, is presumed to
have the rights, and because most societies are political despotisms, it is
despotic government that invents and ordains the rights. But what is
one to make of a "right" to culture, especially when the culture in ques-
tion does not accommodate legal concepts of "right"? Or of a "right"
to history when records were not or could not be kept? Or of a "right"
12. H. MAINE, supra note 4, at 301.
13. Id
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to development when futurist time perspectives are missing on bio-
graphical and social levels? Or of a "right" to armed struggle in behalf
of liberation when exercising such a right implies the establishment of
yet another despotism or the destruction of an existing group's identity?
Such claims have no relationship to law. They can be accepted only
as items of artful rhetoric in attempts at policymaking. Much the same
is true of human rights to health, education, freedom from poverty, and
to foreign assistance in behalf of these concerns when such demands
are pressed in the United Nations. They qualify as economic pro-
grams, legislative projects or expressions of desire, but not as bills of
rights fit to be voted into internationally binding law. In short, the
human rights issue has degenerated into a cover for the promotion of
state interests that are unrelated to individual liberties and freedoms.
Chameleon-like, it assumes whatever color is appropriate to the pre-
vailing political season.
In light of these developments it is difficult to address some of the
general questions posed by the symposium guidelines. How can one
identify derogations of rights when rights are not susceptible to reliable
definitions? Would one not have to say in such a vacuum of norms and
standards that both phenomena are ruled by "underlying policy justifi-
cations," those, namely, which emanate from authoritarian and totali-
tarian regimes? Given that these make up the absolute majority of the
modern society of states as symbolized by the United Nations, is it not
perverse to imagine serious conflicts of jurisdiction between "the state"
and "the international community" when it comes to judging the mer-
its, respectively, of "state security and human rights claims"? Finally,
and in regard to the core problem posed by our assignment, is it not
perhaps idle speculative play to wonder about the proper way of judg-
ing contentions between state or government claims to security on the
one hand and individual claims to security and freedom on the other
when one knows that dissident or contending individuals are swiftly
and definitively silenced in most states?
In short, the preceding overview of the rights issue permits the fol-
lowing general conclusions:
1. Internationally recognized human rights are for the most part
paper rights. Being neither identifiable nor enforceable in the context
of law, they are devoid of concrete relevance to the security considera-
tions of the individual and the state.
2. Freedom and security are possible only in political systems that
have regard for legally enforceable civil rights and obligations. Such
constitutional arrangements exist in Western Europe where they
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originated, North America, Australia, and a few Oriental societies,
chief among them Japan, which have known how to accommodate this
particular Western heritage. They are deliberately excluded in the to-
talitarian systems of Communist states and they have been cast out by
most non-Communist non-Western states. The provisions of the
United Nations Covenant of Civil and Political Rights are far removed
from the actuality of civil and political life in the new nations of the so-
called Third World. 14
3. The United Nations continues to be an organization that facili-
tates interactions among sovereign states. The notion that it represents
a legally and morally unified international community should be dis-
missed as a recent figment of the American imagination.
4. Since the United Nations is a constellation of disparate legal,
moral, ideological, and administrative systems, it is neither qualified
nor capable to pass judgment on derogations or violations of rights in a
member state or to determine whether a particular derogation is justi-
fied by considerations of national security.
5. These realities should persuade the United States and its citi-
zenry that national security and all foreign policymaking, including
that relating to the rights issue in other states, are matters of domestic
jurisdiction.
Such a reorientation is now under way in the United States. It was
evidenced by President Reagan's nominee to be the Assistant Secretary
of State for Human Rights, Elliot Abrams, who has noted that we must
live in the world as we find it and that we must try to be effective.'5
IV. Culture, Human Rights, and American Foreign Policymaking:
the Case of the Soviet Union
The real political world today is not much different from the world
that has existed for the last five decades. It remains technically unified
by the terms of the state system, but, behind a formal sameness in polit-
ical nomenclature and semantic unity in discourse, it continues to be a
manifold of cultures and political systems new and old. It is clear that
nations are not tied together by a common history; that their guiding
ideas of what is right and what is wrong are not analogous; and that,
therefore, their local or regional designs for public order, security, and
14. For comments and illustration, see Emerson, The Fate of Human Rights in the Third
World, 27 WORLD POL. 201 (1975); see also FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: POLITICAL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (R. Gastil ed. 1978).
15. SeeA Neoconservativefor Human Rights Post, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1981, at A7, col.
4.
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survival should not be presumed to converge on identical themes. In
short, it is as illusionist now as it ever was to believe that hundreds,
even thousands of diverse societies would rally to a single rendition of
the human being's place in life.
What has changed in the last decades is the American perception of
this relation between unity and diversity in world politics. Whereas
our trust in the eventual emergence of a world-spanning frame of val-
ues formerly was tempered both by awareness of differences between
world views and modes of thought, and by a long-standing commit-
ment to the principle of state sovereignty and the rules of traditional
international law, this trust now seems to rule political thought in the
United States without regard to these two qualifying principles. In-
deed, both were allowed to atrophy just when it became clear that re-
cent transplants of Western norms had not invalidated the traditional
heritage of most non-Western societies and that convert-states to Marx-
ism-Leninism would not suspend or outgrow those aspects of their ide-
ology and form of government which deny the very principle of
individual freedom.
Another question posed by the symposium organizers-how pre-
cisely does one identify those states whose political cultures are funda-
mentally incompatible with the rights recognized in documents such as
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights--can only be answered af-
ter one comes to terms with the relationship between "security," "cul-
ture," and "the state."
Culture or civilization refers to a given people's linguistic, religious,
and historical heritage. 16 Implicitly or explicitly acknowledged by its
denizens as the source of basic values, norms, and customs, culture
guides thought and behavior in social and political contexts, gathers
succeeding generations around shared ends, and steadies life by provid-
ing a collective will to endure and survive adversity. In short, a na-
tion's cultural infrastructure ensures the group's unity and identity over
time and space. It thus endows men with the kind of security and con-
fidence that cannot be communicated by political systems which are
transient in function and inception whether they issue from the home
culture or are imposed from without.' 7
In terms of this analysis, then, smashing the culture is the surest way
16. My understanding of "culture" is obviously different from what the term "political
culture" projects. See A. BOZEMAN, POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY
(1960); Bozeman, Civilizations under Stress, Re)fections on Cultural Borrowing and Survival,
51 VA. Q. REV. 1 (1975).
17. International history is rich in documentation of this relation between culture and
political system. Consider, for example, the histories of Europe and China.
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of destroying the state, and insecurity inevitably sets in when the cul-
tural infrastructure is significantly destabilized. In other words, it is
important to temper interventions in a culturally alien life style if one
aims at creating, developing, or maintaining independent states.
The propositions that the cultural substratum of a nation instills self-
confidence and that states cannot be independent in foreign relations
unless they are internally secure are not congenial to modern Ameri-
cans. At any rate, beginning in the middle of this century the United
States began pushing Westernization, usually in the name of moderni-
zation and development, with little regard for the values and ideas that
had sustained the non-Western societies over time. The climax of this
simplistic levelling drive came with our interventionist human rights
policy, which aimed openly at modifying the cultural infrastructure of
allies and potential allies in the state system we had built. Predictably,
the policy succeeded all too often in unhinging and confusing hard-
pressed nations, and prepared many for takeover by Communist adver-
saries. Yet, and in counterpoint to this disposition, the United States
consistently has stressed the need for statehood, viewing it as the source
and shield of national security as well as of international peace and
order.
The interaction of these inconsistent policy goals helps explain why
and how United States foreign policies confidently could propagate
self-determination and political independence without prior studies of
an aspirant people's inner social condition and culture. Such questions
as whether a projected state was likely to be viable, whether ethnically
disparate elements were actually desirous or capable of merging into a
nation-state, whether constitutional rule was a locally fitting form of
government, or whether the new state would comply with the estab-
lished norms of international law and the state system as symbolized
first by the League of Nations Covenant and thereafter by the Charter
of the United Nations, were simply viewed as irrelevant. This was so
because it was taken for granted first that the desire for independence is
innate in peoples and therefore unassailable on any ground, and sec-
ond, that any newly independent state would identify automatically
with the values underlying existing Occidental states, particularly those
of the United States.
World developments have not borne out these expectations. The
American cultivation of the state system, however, remains in principle
the most constructive means toward fashioning a world environment
favorable to the national security not only of the United States but of
the majority of states, provided that we recognize cultural disparities
Vol. 9:40, 1982
Human Rights and National Security
and that we take the concept of the independent state seriously. In fact,
this is the most urgent mandate of our times if we want to arrest the
expansion of monolithic totalitarian world states, the only contempo-
rary alternative to the state system.
The Communist state of the Soviet Union is antithetical to the norms
underlying the state system. This means that its understanding of se-
curity and of the need for derogations of human freedom is also wholly
different. In identifying the Soviet Union here as one of "those states
whose political cultures are fundamentally incompatible with the rights
recognized in. . . the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights," atten-
tion must briefly be drawn to the following.
Marxist-Leninist doctrine as interpreted by the Soviet Union insists
that human destiny is the function only of material circumstances,
more particularly of the ongoing world struggle between economic
classes, and that the state and law are just two facets of one single phe-
nomenon, the power of the dominant class. Only political freedoms
that express the interests of the working class are recognized, and they
must be claimed and exercised under the political guidance of the
Communist Party. Individuated rights, by contrast, are viewed as
bourgeois illusions and entrapments. Because the individual human
mind is not accepted as the source of independent thought, freedom of
thought is dismissed as an entirely aberrant and irrelevant notion, as
are claims to liberty of speech and due process of law. Real freedom-
so the promise of the doctrine implies-will be attainable only when
human beings cease to think and feel as individuals endowed with sep-
arate inalienable rights.
The logic of this totalitarian ideology insists that evidence of an in-
dependent bent of mind must be viewed as a transgression of the estab-
lished order and as a serious threat to state security. Those in charge of
administering the creed are therefore not only entitled but also obli-
gated to silence non-conformist speech, throttle non-conformist
thought, and do away with non-conformist people. That the Soviet
elite has carried out these duties has been evidenced over the last sixty
years by official Soviet records of criminal trials, autobiographical an-
nals of life, deprivation and death in labor camps, internal exile, gu-
lags, mental institutions, and by reports from such international
monitoring agencies as Amnesty International.
The security interests of the Soviet Union and of all Marxist-Leninist
states are thus in theory and reality incompatible with individual civil
liberties and political freedoms. "Security," however, also requires that
this basic design be camouflaged by language proclaiming its opposite.
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All Communist dictatorships are for this reason democracies or repub-
lics on paper, each duly adorned with constitutions, legal codes, and
bills of rights. The Soviet constitutions of 1936, 1947, and 1977 and
those of the Soviet Union's satellite states thus enumerate the classical
Western freedoms.' They also prescribe, however, that these rights
can be exercised only to strengthen the established order. Further, they
may not be advanced against the state, because all rights are, after all,
granted by the state, or against the Communist Party, which is sanc-
tioned in the 1977 constitution as "the leading and guiding force of its
[the Soviet Union's] political system, of all state and public
organizations."' 19
The semantics of Communist governance that have characterized
Soviet politics since the Russian revolution are skillfully contrived and
deployed to serve important purposes of statecraft. They make it possi-
ble to dissimulate the actuality of the monolithic system when it is ex-
pedient to do so, to fracture or decompose the Occidental value system
so as to confound thought and its communication in the West and in
non-Communist non-Western societies, and to manipulate decision-
making in the United Nations which proceeds, officially at least, in ac-
cordance with the norms of Western constitutionalism. In short, the
aim of these spurious references to civil and political freedoms, which
are properly described as disinformation, is to win the war against the
mind that the Soviet Union continues to wage relentlessly so as to
make human thought conform wittingly or unwittingly to the dictates
of Marxism-Leninism and the policy aims of the Communist regime.
In light of the Soviet Union's long and unconcealed record of
steadfast belief and behavior it was illusionist on the part of the United
States to assume that the Soviet regime would or could write off its
ideological commitment, political system, and security interests by
signing promises in Helsinki in 1975 to abide by the different United
Nations covenants on human rights. Evidence to this effect began ac-
cumulating soon after the Helsinki accords were signed as it became
clear that both new and traditional techniques of political persecution
18. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R., arts. 48-50 (1977); DRAFT CONSTITUTION
oF CUBA, arts. 50-52 (1975).
19. CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R., art. 6 (1977); see A. VYSINSKY, THE LAW OF THE
SOVIET STATE 55 (1948); Peselj, Recent Cod'fication of Human Rights in Socialist Consiu-
tions, 11 How. L.J. 342 (1965). For extended comments on this aspect of the issues here
under consideration, see Bozeman, supra note 6, at 56-61; Bozeman, How to Think About
Human Rights: The Human Factor in U.S.-Soviet Relations, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NA-
TIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS CONFERENCE (1977); Bozeman, Covert Action and Foreign Pol-
icy: Comparative Studies in Statecraft, in INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE 1980's:
COVERT ACTION 15-79 (R. Godson ed. 1980).
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were being applied, including harassment of political prisoners, repri-
sals against their friends and relatives, and the filing of false-criminal
charges in order to bring political cases into criminal courts.
In short, the Soviet Union did not take Basket III of the Helsinki
accord seriously, and we should have been fully aware of that. Even
more important, it was as predictable in foresight as it was proved cer-
tain in hindsight that the Soviet Union saw the accords as a stratagem
or tactic of deception in the ongoing war of nerves which aims at
achieving hegemony in Europe without provoking a "real" war with
the United States. The true Soviet intent at this meeting on security
and cooperation in Europe was succinctly identified in the following
terms: "[t]he Russians wanted the conference to endorse the present
frontiers of Europe-not only the political frontiers between states, but
the ideological frontiers between East and West." 20 Both sets of fron-
tiers had been advanced steadily-by military diplomacy and action
during World War II and by conference diplomacy from Yalta on-
ward. The Baltic states were thus speedily incorporated in the Soviet
Union, and each post-war uprising of East Europeans in behalf of na-
tional independence, democracy, and civil liberties, whether it
convulsed Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, or Hungary, was
suppressed brutally without eliciting forceful counter-measures from
the United States and its allies.
Long before Helsinki, then, it should have been clear that the East-
ern European states were not sovereign, and that their governments
were not capable of thinking or acting independently in regard to mat-
ters of national security and the liberties of their citizenry. In fact, they
had been deprived officially of their sovereignty in domestic and for-
eign affairs by the Brezhnev doctrine, the 1968 "constitution" of the
Soviet power bloc, which proclaims that "the sovereignty of each so-
cialist country cannot be opposed to the interests of the world of social-
ism, or the world revolutionary movement" and, by implication, to the
interests of the Soviet motherland. The doctrine defines the Soviet
Union as "the central force" in the world revolutionary movement and
empowers it to intervene with force in order to maintain Communist
governments in Eastern Europe.21 This open avowal of Soviet imperi-
alist dominion was reaffirmed in an even harder line a year after the
20. Real Security in Europe, Times (London), July 7, 1975, at 13, col. 1 (editorial). For a
lucid critique of U.S. diplomacy in this matter, see Sulzberger, To the Finland Station, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 2, 1975, at A21, col. 3.
21. See Rostow, Law and the Use of Force by States: The Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 YALE J.
WORLD PUB. ORD. 209 (1981).
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signing of the Helsinki accords. At that time the Soviet Union allowed
publication of an article by the then Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact
forces which stated without qualification that the main military pur-
pose of the Warsaw Pact was to suppress counterrevolutionary activity
in Communist countries, 22 a course of action that was taken both in
1981-1982 in Poland and in 1968 in Czechoslovakia.
Conditions in the "Peoples' Democracies" of Eastern Europe thus
have remained unchanged either by the Helsinki accords or by U.S.
policy. This lack of change also became clear in the immediate after-
math of the conference. For example, the Czechoslovak government
justified harsh measures against members of the Charter 77 human
rights group with the argument that the state's constitution guarantees
freedom of speech and the right of individuals and organizations to
submit proposals and grievances to state bodies only when such rights
are exercised in keeping with the interests of the working people of
Czechoslovakia and in full respect for the socialist state in all its activi-
ties.23 Since these conditions had not been met, the Prague regime in-
sisted that Charter 77 appeals violated the state's constitution, and that
it was entitled therefore to harass, interrogate, arrest, and otherwise pe-
nalize signers of the Charter.24 This announcement prompted the first
official accusation by the United States that a government had failed to
live up to the Helsinki accords. 25 Since then, scores of accusations have
followed, some addressed to the Soviet Union, others to Eastern Euro-
pean states. Gathered at the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe, the West's representatives sharply criticized
Warsaw's repressions in Poland and accused the Soviet Union of "ac-
tive political and material cooperation" with the Polish military regime.
Sounding the common Western theme that martial law in particular
was a violation of the Helsinki Final Act, the British Foreign Secretary
warned that
[tIhe events in Poland have for the moment dashed the hopes not only of
the people of Poland but of all the peoples of Europe who regarded the
Final Act as the symbol of a process of peaceful change. 26
The Swedish Foreign Minister concluded that the gathering had be-
come "a self-destructing exercise, where what little was left of the Hel-
22. For excerpts from General Sergei M. Satemenko's article, see N.Y. Times, May 8,
1976, at A5, col. 1.
23. See Czechoslovaks Say Signers of Petition Seek Return of '68, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13,
1977, at A3, col. 4.
24. See Human Rights Charter Critizedin Prague, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1977 at A5, col. 1.
25. See Gwertzman, U.S. Asserts Prague Violates Covenant About Human Rights, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 27, 1977, at Al, col. 6.
26. Soviet Ends Effort to Bar Talks on Poland, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1982, at A3, col. 1.
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sinki spirit threatens to evaporate. '2 7 But the American delegate
remarked that "We are not pushing for a hasty recess. . . . We have
come here with no date."2 8
To all this one is entitled to add that the West, as led by the United
States, lacked in Helsinki and in Madrid a comprehensive policy
scheme, linking the rhetorical defense of individual political freedoms
to other, more credible defenses of both liberty and state security. In
fact, a long-range strategic doctrine in which the parameters of security
for the United States and Europe are set out clearly has been lacking
throughout this century, probably because foreign policymaking in the
American democratic system cannot rely on a time-transcendent bipar-
tisan consensus on national security requirements. The absence of this
dimension in thought and planning explains why we did not know bet-
ter than to pay for the Helsinki basket of paper rights by ratifying three
processes that have slowly but ineluctably undermined our position in
the world-the invalidation of the state system, the forfeiture of geopo-
litically vital European space, and the erosion of Western culture.
These processes have been furthered methodically by the Soviet
Union from its inception onward. In regard to the state system, the
traditionally defined "state" was deliberately left in place as the cover
for political organizations on local and international levels that differ
radically from the traditional norm of the state. The Leninist doctrine
of ideological and territorial expansion spawned an entirely new type
of multi-national empire-first in Russia and subsequently in China
and Viet Nam-by insisting that existing territorial state boundaries
are wholly provisional since the rightful limits of jurisdiction have not
yet been reached. However, "state" continues to be the correct appella-
tion for all the formerly independent states that have been absorbed by
these imperial states. The Soviet Union's Eastern European satellites
are not classified as protectorates, colonies, or dominions in the manner
customary, for example, in the defunct French and British empires.
Rather, each continues to rank as a sovereign state in international re-
lations and is entitled to a full vote under provisions of the United Na-
tions Charter.
The United States did not pay serious attention to the slow but well
directed transformation of the world's multi-state system into a few
ideologically closely related imperial spheres. This was so because we
had long misperceived the Soviet Union as just another, albeit more
27. Id.
28. Id
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radical socialist state, and because influential intellectual elites in the
West willingly had subscribed to the Leninist article of faith that impe-
rialism could be generated only by "capitalist" states in Europe and
North America. Theory thus effectively screened the reality that the
Soviet Union was committed to assembling and administering imperial
holdings in all of the world's continents, and that it was doing so
mainly by destabilizing and dominating the "new" states, those,
namely, which the United States had helped create in the context of the
World Wars by insisting on the dissolution of the defeated German,
Turkish, and Austrian empires and thereafter of the French and British
empires.
A much neglected aspect of this protracted, historically fateful con-
test between two opposite world views and value systems is the gradual
dissembling of numerous concepts adjunct to that of the democratic
state, among them the principle of self-determination. This idea was as
important to Woodrow Wilson as it was to Lenin. Both appreciated it
as a device to break up existing empires. However, Wilson accepted
such a potential defiance of an established political order as the neces-
sary prelude to the achievement of lasting national independence.
Lenin, by contrast, treated self-determination as a tool to pry freedom-
seeking groups, such as ethnic or religious minorities and colonial peo-
ples, loose from the existing bourgeois "imperialist" order only to make
them serve the Soviet Union first as shock troops in the struggle against
the camp of capitalist democracies and thereafter as satellites in the
Soviet-dominated camp of socialism. In other words, the Soviet Union
has used independence as a tactic for inducing dependence.
The Soviet Union has successfully deployed its well coordinated
long-range policies, especially by advancing and consolidating its terri-
torial and ideological frontiers in Europe. This achievement consti-
tutes an unqualified defeat for the security interests of the United States
and Europe's remaining independent states. Indeed, it is no exaggera-
tion to say that we peaceably lost the security which our military vic-
tory over Nazi Germany had been meant to assure, and that we have
ourselves to blame for that defeat. Nothing in our experience of the
twentieth century world had thus persuaded us that all foreign policy
initiatives, especially those relating to Europe, need in-depth analysis
in geopolitical, historical, and cultural terms if they are to be carried
out effectively.
The case for the primacy of Europe in the destiny of the United
States need not be argued here. The record of our policy failures sug-
gests, however, that successive American administrations-in striking
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contrast to successive Soviet regimes-did not ask or come to terms
with a few elementary, yet strategically vital questions. What is Eu-
rope? Where does it-and therewith the West-take off from the Eur-
asian landmass? Geographically, Europe begins in the vicinity of the
Ural mountains. But where in terms of history, culture, and politics is
the ideological frontier separating East from West and indicating
which space is geopolitically so vital to the collective security interests
of Western states that it warrants holding even at great cost?
The answers to these questions would have been within reach of U.S.
statecraft had "security" been related to cultural consciousness and had
the "rights issue" been used as an indicator of political identity. Serv-
ing as a tool for political analysis, it would have indicated clearly that
generations of people in the broad belt stretching from Finland to the
Adriatic Sea have lived to the west of a most important line separating
communities Christianized by Rome (the later split between Catholi-
cism and Protestantism is not relevant in this context) from those
Christianized by Constantinople. Prominent among the latter are the
Russians, who succeeded to the imperial Byzantine and Greek-Ortho-
dox tradition before experiencing that of their Mongolian conquerors
and who therefore were left untouched by the great movements of the
Renaissance. Prominent among the former are Baltic groups, Poles,
Germans, Bohemians, Croats, Hungarians, and others who partici-
pated for centuries in the political, moral, and legal systems which to-
gether make up the civilization of the West, and who consequently
understand the concept of individuated freedom. It is here, therefore,
that the Communist break with the humanist tradition has been exper-
ienced most acutely and that revolts on behalf of nationalism, Christi-
anity and individual rights are taking place continuously.
This relation between "Eastern" and "Western" Europe has gener-
ally gone unnoticed in the United States, where policy-related thought
ignores history and culture and remains short-term, pragmatic, and
therefore basically reactive rather than creative. Whether due to over-
sight, ignorance, or deliberate disposition, the United States did not
pursue the rights issue when to do so would have meant the difference
between security and insecurity, or victory and defeat, namely, before,
during and after World War II, when a powerful United States could
have insisted on holding the real boundary between East and West.
Instead it gratuitously ratified the Soviet-imposed Oder/Neisse line
and the division of Germany-recognized as Europe's (and NATO's)
heartland today-and allowed the West's hedge-guarding nations to
pass behind the Iron Curtain one by one. The Helsinki climax of this
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development was then simply rationalized by President Ford, who be-
lieved that the failure of the Helsinki process would leave Europe no
worse off than it had been.29 In fact, seven years later, when Polish
military forces advised by their Soviet masters, were putting down an-
other determined Polish uprising, Secretary of State Alexander M.
Haig, Jr., had to wonder: "[h]ow can these actions be reconciled with
Polish and Soviet signatures of the Helsinki accords?" while also assur-
ing the world that "[t]he American people, and the other peoples as
well, could never countenance a cynical attempt to place the Polish
tragedy beyond the reach of the Helsinki Final Act."'30
V. Human Rights and American Foreign Policymaking: the Case
of East Asia
The scope of the present paper allows only a selective review of non-
Western records as they bear on the task requested of me, namely to
identify "those states whose political cultures are fundamentally in-
compatible with the rights recognized in documents like the Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights." In the following case references, the
focus remains on: (1) the relation between state security and the indi-
vidual's civil and political freedoms; (2) the roots of prevalent concep-
tions in the nation's cultural infrastructure; and (3) the impact of the
situation on the security of the United States.
The People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) is a totalitarian system and
therefore by definition deliberately excludes civil liberties and political
freedoms. Earlier comments made in connection with the Soviet
Union, therefore, apply to the P.R.C. as well. This conclusion is borne
out fully by the Beijing regime's own statements, official press com-
mentaries, information from Chinese visitors and escapees, and above
all by detailed analytical reports about life in China from experienced
Western sinologists and scholarly journalists.31 These sources firmly
document that millions of Chinese were liquidated because they were
viewed as counterrevolutionaries, former landlords, Kuomingtang offi-
29. See President Ford Interviewedfor Public Television, 73 DEPT. STATE BULL. 377, 377-
78 (1975).
30. Address by Secretary Haig, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(Feb. 9, 1982), reprinted in DEPT. STATE BULL., Apr. 1982, at 37, 38.
31. See generally S. LEYS, CHINESE SHADOWS (1977); C. JO-HSI, THE EXECUTION OF
MAYOR YIN AND OTHER STORIES FROM THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLU-
TION (N. Ing & H. Goldblatt trans. 1978); T. BERNSTEIN, UP TO THE MOUNTAINS AND
DOWN TO THE VILLAGES (1968); F. BUTTERFIELD, CHINA ALIVE IN THE BITTER SEA (1982);
Leng, Human Rights in Chinese Political Culture, in THE MORAL IMPERATIVES OF HUMAN
RIGHTS: A WORLD SURVEY 81 (K. Thompson ed. 1980); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLIT-
ICAL IMPRISONMENT IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1978).
Vol. 9:40, 1982
Human Rights and National Security
cials, or simply "bad elements"-first in 1949-1952 and thereafter in
1957 during the so-called "Anti-Rightist Campaign," in 1966-1969 dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution, in 1973-1975 during the "Anti-Lin Piao
and Anti-Confucius Campaign," and thereafter in consequence of the
"Denunciation of the Gang of Four" affair.
As in the Soviet Union, political repression and persecution have
been an ongoing policy since the establishment of the state, despite the
existence of Western-type constitutions and codes of law. After the
"Hundred Flowers Period," several million students, teachers, scien-
tists, writers, lawyers, doctors, and other intellectuals were sent to work
in the countryside or sentenced to labor camps. During the "Cultural
Revolution," all individuals, indeed whole families, became potential
targets. "Almost every Chinese I got to know during my 20 months in
Peking," Fox Butterfield notes, "had a tale of political persecution."
From their stories it would appear that a whole generation of Chinese
knew nothing but arbitrary accusations, violent swings in political line,
unjustified arrests, torture, and imprisonment, 32 a destiny also shared
by non-Chinese minorities and conquered nations. For example, geno-
cide was a decisive aspect of the takeover of Tibet.33
Violations of the human being's physical and mental integrity seem
to have been as programmed in Communist China as they were in the
Soviet Union. This similarity, together with numerous other analogous
patterns of administration, among them the persecution of religions
and their leaders, explains a Chinese informant's recent statement that
"China really isn't that different from the Soviet Union. ' 34 Compari-
sons of those two totalitarian systems also indicate, however, that Chi-
nese methods of thought control are more refined. One such method is
32. See F. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 31, at 347. Official Chinese confirmation of abuses
under the "Gang of Four" include the following notices: in a broadcast in November 1977,
the Public Security Ministry reported cases of forced confessions and torture of disgraced
party members. The People's Daily, in February, 1978, reported cases of discrimination
against people because of family origin. The New China News Agency, in June, 1978,
charged that "tens of thousands" in Shanghai had been "cruelly tortured and persecuted."
Deng Xiaoping is reported to have spoken of the existence of a state of lawlessness, arbitrary
rule, and "fascist tyranny" under the influence of the "Gang of Four."
It was reported on June 6, 1978 that the Beijing government had decided to release some
110,000 political prisoners detained since 1957. N.Y. Times, June 6, 1978, at Al, col. 2. See
generally Leng, supra note 3 1.
33. See TIBET AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC: A REPORT TO THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS BY ITS LEGAL INQUIRY COMMITTEE ON TIBET (1960). See
in particular id. app. to ch. 4 at 215; statement no. I at 221; statements nos. 4-5 at 225-26;
statement no. 5 at 226; statement no. 7 at 229; statement no. 10 at 233; statement no. 26 at
253; statement no. 32 at 259; statement nos. 35-39 at 265-71; statement no. 44 at 276.
34. F. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 31, at 451.
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the "struggle session," which a prisoner in Maoist China described as
follows:
[t]he Struggle. . . is a peculiarly Chinese invention, combining intimida-
tion, humiliation, and sheer exhaustion. Briefly described, it is an intel-
lectual gang-beating of one man by many, sometimes even thousands, in
which the victim has no defense, even the truth. 35
"Truth" is what the party leadership establishes from occasion to occa-
sion. Facts are facts only when perceived as such by the authority of
the day-a type of thought control that encompasses the present and
the past, as a young Chinese explained:
[i]f the leader says of such and such an event, "it never happened"-well,
it never happened. If he says that two and two are five, well, two and two
are five. This prospect frightens me much more than bombs.3 6
Relentless programs of "political study" and a tight policing system are
everywhere in place to buttress this operational code. Government
agents operate in every city street or block overhearing and overseeing
residents, directing family relations, and censoring or penalizing infrac-
tions. In short, the ordinary person does not have the right to think or
act independently. The very idea of an individuated existence, not to
speak of individuated rights and political freedoms, is proscribed in the
P.R.C. as totally incompatible with the security of the state.
The P.R.C. today is rightly defined by its ideologues as a Marxist-
Leninist-Stalinist society. It is also an heir, however, to the Han, Sui,
T'ang, and Manchu dynasties. In contrast to Russia's Communist em-
pire, which can be identified more or less exclusively with the ideology
of Marxism-Leninism, that of modem China is strongly supported by
an authentic self-contained and creative civilization which had endured
for at least three millennia before being challenged-first in the nine-
teenth century by Europe, including Tsarist Russia, and then in the
twentieth century by Communist Russia. The Maoist destruction of
the Chinese republic established in response to Western influences was
attended by the almost automatic resuscitation of ancient, deeply en-
trenched principles of administration which agreed in most essential
respects with those espoused by Mao Tse-tung. Indeed, it was the vig-
orous presence of non-Communist theories which explains why Lenin-
ism could be "sinified" easily, and the same set of traditionally effective
precepts may well eventually modify the Marxist-Leninist axioms now
in force.
Mao Tse-tung's writings and speeches, as well as the publications of
35. Id at 342.
36. Id at 405.
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the controlled press, abound in explicit and allusive references to the
Chinese past. These references are negative with respect to Confucian-
ism, but deferential to the Legalists (or Realists), among them in partic-
ular Sun Tzu, Shang Yang, and Han Fei Tzu, who were collectively
instrumental in assuring the first unification of China in the third cen-
tury B.C. after the long period of "The Warring States" and in laying
solid foundations for China's bureaucracy and statecraft.
Neither Confucianism nor Legalism can be associated with princi-
ples evocative of civil liberty and political freedom. The focus of Chi-
nese ethics and politics has never been on the individual person but
rather on the web of human relations in which each mortal was pre-
sumed to be enclosed. Confucians thus insisted that the human being
is above all a function of the family and that he must therefore comply
with the obligations attendant on the particular status assigned him in
the context of the "Five Classic Relations." An objective and impartial
public law was absent in this scheme, while inequality was the ethically
prescribed norm. For example, because the power of the parent over a
son was absolute, the father was entitled to punish the latter's filial dis-
obedience by beheading, strangling, or burying him alive if the trans-
gression was classified as severe. Similar punishments could be meted
out to daughters-in-law as when they falsely accused parents-in-law.
In accordance with the same hierarchical order the young were forbid-
den to fight back when attacked by those older than themselves. In-
quiries into motivation, intent, and possibilities of accidental
wrongdoing were never required, because the issue was the affront to
the status occupied by the superior person in the case, not the act per
se.
The Legalists, by contrast, championed an egalitarian public "law,"
but this law, based on the firm conviction that human nature is intrinsi-
cally evil, also stood for punishment-albeit by command of the
government. 37
37. For detailed records and discussions of the issues here under review, see T. CH'U,
LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 27, 42-52 (1961) (parents' authority, family law
and relations, father's power to punish); P. CH'EN, CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION UNDER THE
MONGOLS, THE CODE OF 1291 AS RECONSTRUCTED 41-98 (1979) (penal system, administra-
tion ofjustice, and torture to induce confession); J. SPENCE, THE DEATH OF WOMAN WANG
(1978) (misery of lower class life in seventeenth century China); I THE T'ANG CODE 17-23
(W. Johnson trans. 1979) (the death penalty, collective prosecution, family law, offenses
against superiors, and life exile). The T'ang Code is the most important of China's codes. It
was adopted by Japanese emperors and greatly influenced Korean and Vietnamese law. See
A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD 140-60 (1971) (com-
ments and references to other authorities on Chinese law); J. ESCARRA, LE DROIT CHINOIS
(1936); J. NEEDHAM, 2 SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA (1954).
On the Legalists, see BASIC WRITINGS OF Mo TzU, HSUN TZU, AND HAN FEI Tzu (B.
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The argument that Legalism and Leninism did not meet by chance is
corroborated by a study of China's history and its harshly repressive
penal codes, beginning with the T'ang Code, which is based on early
Legalist legislation. Maoists pointed proudly to the "progressive view
of history" which permeates Legalist literature and to commendable
precedents in punishing and policing practices developed by the Legal-
ists. These are illustrated by the following:
A person who failed to report on and expose an "evil person" would be
cut in two, whereas a person who reported on and exposed an "evil per-
son" would be rewarded in the same way as one who decapitated an en-
emy in the front line.
Lord Shang advised Duke Hsiao of Ch'in to compile a register by divid-
ing the people into groups of five and ten households; to adopt the puni-
tive method of collective liability; to burn the Book of Poetry and the
Book of History in order to make laws and regulations clear; to stop pri-
vate requests... ; to encourage those who were engaged in farming and
war.... The Duke implemented these measures and Ch'in became rich
and strong.
The Second Emperor was pleased with the record of Legalist policies of
"surveillance and castigation," with the result that "half of the men walk-
ing on the roads had received punishment and the bodies of executed men
piled up in the market places. '38
However, the Beijing regime also has to contend with the determined
revival of certain traditional customs in the officially condemned Con-
fucian family system. The traditional preference for a male child over
a female one is thus said to pose the greatest obstacle to the current
policy of limiting new families to a single child. The government press
reports regularly that wives known to expect female offspring are urged
to abort and threatened with divorce. Some of those who give birth to
daughters are abused and humiliated, beaten senseless by their hus-
bands and parents-in-law, or driven into mental breakdowns and sui-
cide. Also it is as common today as it was in the past to dispose of
unwanted female children, usually through drowning.3 9 Other customs
that have been resuscitated include the selling of young women and the
betrothal, by parental arrangements, of children as young as five years.
Watson trans. 1964); W. YANG, THE BOOK OF LORD SHANG: A CLASSIC OF THE CHINESE
SCHOOL OF LAW (J. Duyvendak trans. 1963); A. WALEY, THREE WAYS OF THOUGHT IN
ANCIENT CHINA (1939). See also SHANG YANG'S REFORMS AND STATE CONTROL IN CHINA
(L. Yu-ning ed. 1977) (analysis of "political historiography" in Maoist China).
38. SHANG YANG'S REFORMS AND STATE CONTROL IN CHINA, supra note 37, at 35-36,
42, 48 n.1. The last quotation is taken from K. Hsiao, Legalism and Autocracy in Tradi-
tional China 127 (unpublished manuscript).
39. For one of numerous reports on this aspect of modem China, see Wren, Old Neimesis
Haunts China on Birth Plan, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1982, at A9, col. 1.
Vol. 9:40, 1982
Human Rights and National Security
The individual, then, was not recognized in pre-Communist China as
an autonomous person or as a citizen endowed with political freedoms.
His official status changed during the brief period of Westernization,
when laws, culminating in the 1930-1931 code, were drafted from Eu-
ropean models. This reform had no, chance of becoming effectual,
however, because it was superimposed on a code of ethics and institu-
tions that remained thoroughly Chinese.40
A similar if not analogous curve from nativism to Westernization
and back again to Chinese roots can be delineated in regard to the twin
conceptions of the state and national security. The Western idea of
"the state" was entirely alien to the Chinese, as were the allied notions
of sovereignty and territoriality. Historically, the Chinese thought of
the space they occupied as the exclusive abode of "Civilization" writ
large. Peoples on the periphery of this core or Middle Kingdom of the
world were thus by definition perceived as inferiors-barbarians sub-
ject to conquest whenever this was deemed necessary by the imperial
administration, and forever in need of tutelage which might include
chastisement by punitive war. In sum, China was conceived as an em-
pire whose contours had to be indeterminate. Yet it also constituted a
family of nations on the analogy of the classical Confucian model of
the natural family. For just as the father, the elder brother, or the
younger brother had assigned roles to play in the nuclear association,
so did each inferior people have its special tasks, privileges, and tribute
assessments. China's Asian orbit, then, was not a system of equal sov-
ereign states, but rather, in the context of the doctrines of unity and the
Heavenly Mandate, it was viewed as merely the outer fringe of the ad-
ministration of China proper. This world view explains why interna-
tional law of the Western type could not make a meaningful connection
with the Chinese thought world.41
The preceding identification of China as a culture and a political
system suggests the following conclusions. First, individuated legal
rights always have been inconceivable in China, and international cov-
enants assuring respect for such rights should at no time have been
presumed to have meaning in that civilization. What is new in Maoist
40. J. ESCARRA, supra note 37 at 15, 31, 39, 59, 436, 451.
41. See Bozeman, supra note 1, at 74-80 (juxtaposition of the Western and Chinese sys-
tems of public order); see also Bozeman, War and the Clash of.Ideas, 20 ORBis 61 (1976); J.
ESCARRA, supra note 37; A. WALEY, supra note 37, at 217 (sole aim of the state is to main-
tain and, if possible, to expand its frontiers); I. Hsu, CHINA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY
oF NATIONS, THE DIPLOMATIC PHASE 1858-1880 13-16 (1960) (no consciousness of "the
state" as a nation or as a jurisdiction bounded by definite territorial frontiers; rather, the
cause of China was traditionally related to the Emperor as the Son of Heaven and the Fa-
ther of a family of nations).
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China is the totalitarian control of private and public life, which
eclipsed, and perhaps destroyed, China's deeply rooted humanist infra-
structure, with its strong accent on aspiration and learning and its intri-
cate codes of ethics for inter-personal and inter-group relations.
Second, state or "regime" security as conceived by the Chinese Com-
munist leadership is absolutely dependent on the total subjugation of
China's people and on the greatest possible degree of control over non-
Chinese nations in adjoining areas.
These conclusions lend support to one of Fox Butterfield's observa-
tions. For all the cynicism, awareness of corruption in party ranks, un-
employment, inflation, and other troubles he found, he yet "had no
sense that the Communists' hold on China is in danger. For one thing,
their control apparatus with its police, the danwei organization, the
street committees, and political study, remains intact .... -42 Security
policies of the United States, therefore, cannot rely on China's compli-
ance with the norms of freedom we espouse. In light of our incessant
reprimands of rights violations in such non-totalitarian states as Chile,
Argentina, El Salvador, or South Africa, it is interesting that we have
not taken the P.R.C. severely to task for its ongoing non-conformism.
The following considerations, set forth by Michael Oksenberg, supply
some of the reasons for this oversight, at least as it relates to the State
Department during the Carter administration. Oksenberg identifies the
United States with the value of liberty, the Soviet Union with the com-
mitment to accelerate economic growth, and the P.R.C. with the value
of "economic equality and the capacity of the dispossessed to improve
their lot through will and organization. ' 43 He grants that Peking's pur-
suit of its goals has resulted in a political order "devoid of meaningful
political freedom," and that the P.R.C. today, is "a utilitarian society,
without frills and with little concern for beauty and aesthetics." Yet he
insists that each of the three values-liberty, growth, and equality-
speaks to an important aspect of the human condition and that one
should seek for ways which allow the United States, the U.S.S.R. and
the P.R.C. "to remain true to their respective revolutionary traditions."
The major challenge as seen by this former State Department authority
on China is:
42. F. BUTrERFIELD, supra note 31, at 448.
43. Oksenberg, Sino-American Relations in a New Asian Contest, in DRAGON AND EA-
GLE; UNITED STATES-CHINA RELATIONS: PAST AND FUTURE 14 (M. Oksenberg & R,
Oxman, eds. 1978). For a discussion of the difference in focus between Americans and Chi-
nese in discussing particular attributes of their national character, see id at 17. For the
astounding statement that the rulers of "both traditional and contemporary China have con-
sidered one of their principal tasks to be the creation of a moral order," see id at 19.
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[c]an the ideas of Jefferson and Mao Tse-Tung . . . coexist as we seek
areas of cooperation? . . . If the terms of exchange between these two
societies can become genuinely reciprocal, then we may discover that
there is less tension between the values of our two revolutions than is
currently believed.44
The human rights issue was obviously not considered relevant either
for an understanding of the P.R.C. or for strategic planning in behalf of
American security interests.
The continued shifts in our perception of Communism and of the
P.R.C., and our equally continued policy of oscillation between the ex-
tremes of pragmatism and principle-in this case the defense of free-
dom-have had wholly negative effects upon the entire non-
Communist world. They have stultified the evolution of a basic long-
range American design for the strategically all-important Pacific re-
gion, and they have brought nothing but confusion and uneasiness to
the area's independent nations that separate us from the P.R.C., among
them specifically Taiwan, South Korea, and the ASEAN group of
nations.
These non-Communist states are determined to retain their indepen-
dence, yet all are threatened today by the expansionist Communist em-
pires of China, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Most of the societies in
question were deeply influenced in previous centuries by Confucian
China and in modem times by Europe and then by the United States.
Indeed, the United States exerted itself to make them sovereign states
in the name of self-determination and independence, aspirations now
recognized in the United Nations as the foremost of all human rights.
This commitment to self-determination and independence informs
our oft-stated goal to establish a world society of separate sovereign
states. The commitment and the goal have been in obvious collision
for some time now not only with the world views forcefully pro-
pounded by the P.R.C., the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and their respec-
tive surrogate nations, but also, and more importantly, with our own
liberal dispositions toward the two principal Communist hegemonies.
Our Asian dilemma, which is essentially self-induced, is well illustrated
today by the predicament of Taiwan.
The United States erred in acceding to the view, shared by the
P.R.C. and Taiwan, that there is only one China, and in choosing to
ground this policy in international law. This reference to international
law makes no connection either with the Confucian or with the Com-
munist normative system. Both systems value international law mainly
44. Id at 14.
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as a defensive weapon in dealing with the West.45 Further, interna-
tional law was never the major guide to perceiving a state's identity
even in its European homeland.
When it became clear that the Maoist version of Marxism-Leninism
was firmly entrenched in the P.R.C., the United States should have
guided the Taiwanese toward the recognition that they do in fact con-
stitute a sovereign state, that this state is and will remain completely
separate from the P.R.C., and that the United States can and will de-
fend its identity. The following features mark Taiwan's identity: it is a
modern Confucian society that is opposed to Communism; it is an in-
tellectually active and productive society; it is politically stable and well
ruled; and it has created one of the most modern and successful econo-
mies in the world. These differences are openly acknowledged by each
of the two Chinas.46
Important demographic factors strongly support the case for a "Two
Chinas" policy. Of Taiwan's 18,000,000 inhabitants, 85% are native
Taiwanese. Their representatives are now rising to power as the Kuo-
mintang old guard retires, and they too seem to be deeply distrustful of
the mainland government. The latter, in turn, is fearful that the ascen-
dancy of this element may establish a government favoring total inde-
pendence from the mainland.
This, then, is not the time to underwrite past errors in vision, to sign
over a modern, moderately Confucian society to the totalitarian control
of Communism, or to reprimand Taiwanese authorities for retaining
martial law. In the context of our rights policy this would be the least
credible and honorable course, and in the context of our security poli-
cies, it would only compound our earlier mistakes.
The following account of a conversation in 1944 with then Secretary
of the Navy James Forrestal indicates what American strategy should
be if it is to serve the long-range security interests of the nation:
[h]e asked us for a map of the Pacific, and when we produced it, he
showed us the twin drives [of American forces]-one across the mid-Pa-
cific and one up from the south toward the Philippines. He tapped the
map at Formosa and said, "This is the whole key to the future in the
Pacific. He who controls Formosa can oversee the whole coast of continen-
talAsia. We can never, never let this island be controlled by any power
potentially hostile to us. It is from bases here that we must maintain a
45. See Bozeman, supra note 2, at 65; see also A. BOZEMAN, THE FUTURE OF LAW IN A
MULTICULTURAL WORLD 140-52 (1971).
46. See, e.g., F. BUTrERFIELD, supra note 31, at 448. A young Mainlander made the
following remark: "What young people like me want to know is why China can't do as well
as Taiwan." Id
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forward posture in a postwar Asia.47
The Forrestal vision is even more persuasive today than it was forty
years ago, before the Communist takeover of mainland China, Tibet,
North Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and the consequent
ouster of American influence from the Eurasian landmass. Since the
United States is itself basically a compact continental power, it may
well have been instinctively inclined to relate its national security poli-
cies primarily to states that also controlled a great and continuous ex-
panse of densely populated land, even if they were recognized as actual
or potential enemies with weak economies. This perception of the
world environment is myopic and outdated. We should shift our vi-
sion, therefore, to the vast ocean separating America from Asia, the
plurality of independent, non-Communist states that it accommodates
on islands and peninsulas and, above all, to the region's ethnically and
culturally diverse nations. These include some of the world's most tal-
ented, historically experienced, and cosmopolitan peoples. Contrary to
China, they were widening their horizons through navigation, trade,
and other modes of interaction. Having had to relate to greatly various
"international systems" among them those fashioned by Hindu and
Buddhist India, China, ;Islamic traders and conquerors, western
Europeans, Japanese, and Americans, they learned to borrow and as-
similate alien ideas without losing their cultural identity.
The city state of Singapore exemplifies some of these achievements
today in that it is consciously administering the fusion of Confucian
and Western (mainly Anglo-American) mainsprings of culture. The is-
land state's form of government is patterned on European parliamen-
tary systems, and so is its economy. In fact, apart from Japan,
Singapore enjoys the highest living standard in Asia. Further, it is in-
ternationally esteemed as a highly disciplined society, having one of the
lowest crime rates in the world. Yet, the government of Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew has been disturbed by what it sees as a falling away
from certain ancient moral values that are thought to be capable of
protecting this modern city state. Because these are essentially Con-
fucian in nature (75% of the approximately 2.4 million Singaporeans
are ethnic Chinese), it has been decided to counter the slippage into
what might become hedonistic modernism by reviving instruction in
Confucian ethics.
The corrections now under way bear directly on the present conflict
between Eastern and Western conceptions of the individual and his
47. V. WALTERS, SILENT MISSION 111 (1978).
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rights. The new laws are being introduced mainly in order to return to
such traditional Chinese values as filial piety, scholarly discipline, de-
corum, and a proper sense of shame so as to weaken the impact of
certain liberal western concepts that place too much emphasis on
youth, vitality, and selfish individualism, and not enough on respect for
age, and wisdom and on the moral duty to take care of the family's old.
Some of these reforms may deviate from contemporary American con-
ceptions of "liberty," but most appear readily compatible with the
political freedoms implicit in the existing parliamentary system of
government.48
The general issue before us is thus neatly joined in this particular
case: the cultural infrastructure is being reasserted deliberately so as to
assure the security of a state that is severely threatened by aggressive
forces from without. Further, in the measure in which this policy is
deemed by some American observers to be a "derogation" of interna-
tional covenants, it is relevant to note that the policy has been carried
out overtly, explicitly, and for clearly stated reasons. Most departures
from such allegedly universally binding norms are, by contrast, not
considered policies but spontaneous reactions to felt threats and needs
that emanate from the idigenous sub-stratum of values and beliefs.
This constellation of challenges and responses is well illustrated by
South Korea, an indispensable ally of the United States in the context
of the geopolitical realities persuasively stressed in the Forrestal doc-
trine. Marked for extinction by the Soviet Union and its North Korean
surrogate, South Korea is an independent yet authoritarian state today.
Its problems with our strictures concerning individuated rights can be
understood only in light of the nation's long and complex history.
At the beginning of this century, Korea was a Confucian monarchy,
tutored throughout centuries by the "Father" Emperor of the Middle
Kingdom within whose family it served as an important hedge-guard-
ing satellite. Subsequently, after the eclipse of China and the ascen-
dancy of Japan, Korea became the latter's colony for thirty-five years.
Neither of these morally and politically trying epochs provided incen-
tives to develop the kind of democratic institutions considered de
rigueur by contemporary American critics of non-Western regimes.49
48. For a brief survey of this issue see Campbell, Singapore Plans to Revive Study of
Confucianism, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1982, at A2, col. 3.
49. Historical perspectives were stressed by the Department of State in a policy state-
ment published in 1974. See Department Discusses the Human Rights Situation in the Repub-
lic of Korea, 71 DEPT. STATE BULL. 305 (1974) (statement of Arthur Hummel, Acting
Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs); see also M. NELSON, KOREA AND
THE OLD ORDERS IN EASTERN ASIA (1946) (excellent historical exposition). In regard to
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Liberation and independence were followed by war, the nation's di-
vision, and relentless aggressive moves by North Korea's Soviet-sup-
ported regime to thwart South Korea's development toward democracy
and subdue its will to survive so as to bring about re-unification on
Communist terms. Despite these adversities, Seoul's government suc-
ceeded in recording near miraculous economic growth, maintaining its
military defense forces, and assuring the nation's independence. The
price for this kind of security-and the majority of the citizenry appear
to have paid it willingly-has been the suspension or limitation of some
of the rights listed in the country's modem Western-type constitution
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, among them habeas
corpus, the right to strike, and freedom to dissent on major policy
issues.
Non-compliance with Western standards of free speech and aca-
demic freedom in general has evoked the most criticism in intellectual
circles in the United States, especially during the Carter administra-
tion. It is useful, therefore, in the case of South Korea as in that of
Taiwan or Singapore, to remember the millennial non-Communist
Chinese heritage that conditioned all sinicized societies to value con-
sensus and avoid conflict and confusion. The T'ang Code's list of
crimes thus begins with the "Ten Great Abominations," the first being
"plotting rebellion" and the seventh "discord," by which is meant any-
thing that upsets the harmony of the Five Classic Relationships. Who-
ever acts from a different ethic is thus considered to act criminally in
this civilization.
This is the irremovable backdrop for evaluating the South Korean
reaction to Kim Dae Jung's persistent dissent and to violent student
demonstrations against the government of Chun Doo Hwan.50 It also
explains why President Chun generally is not viewed in South Korea as
the tyrannical ogre that American critics depict, but rather, and in Con-
fucian terms, as the new father of the Korean family or as the all-provi-
dent king.
In light of these cultural realities and of the American dependence
on an independent self-reliant Korea, the United States should return
to the policy position outlined by the State Department in 1974 when
modem times, see KOREAN POLITICS IN TRANSITION (E. Wright ed. 1975) (of particular
interest here is an article entitled Toward a New Theory of Korean Politics: A Reexamination
of Traditional Factors by Pyong-choon Hahm, then Ambassador to the United States). See
also Myers, The U.S. andKorea: Values in Conflict, WORLD VIEW, Oct. 1981, at 13 (analysis
of current problems of U.S. policy).
50. See Myers, supra note 49. See also Wall St. J., May 30, 1980, at 20, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, May 27, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
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the Department stressed the need for military assistance in response to
congressional doubt of its appropriateness for a "repressive" society.
Korea's political institutions may be imperfect but they are in place, it
noted. Further, Korea is a viable independent state and in that capac-
ity a key element of American efforts to assure the security of Northeast
Asia. Besides, congressional critics were reminded,
Our aid is not intended as support to, or leverage on any given govern-
ment or leader, but is rather provided to enable a given country to de-
velop its institutions so that to the greatest extent possible it can enjoy
freedom, be self-reliant, and can contribute to world peace and
prosperity.5 '
VI. Conclusion
The historical records presented in this paper do not support the
common American trust in the universal validity of civil liberties, indi-
viduated political freedoms, and the concept of equality. Amplified by
the results of studies of India, the Middle East, and Black Africa, which
for reasons of space could not be included in this discussion of the rela-
tion between human rights and national security, the evidence supports
the conclusion that the infrastructures of non-Western societies simply
cannot sustain the Occidental ideas of the autonomous person and the
constitutionally organized state. The normative principles that have
assured security and survival in the literate civilizations of the Orient
and in traditionally nonliterate Africa are rather social constraint, ine-
quality, and authoritarian rule. Missing are equivalents for Western-
type constitutional and criminal law, the elementary prerequisites for
political freedoms and individuated rights.
These realities were obscured during the brief period of Westerniza-
tion. Now, however, they are reasserting themselves throughout the so-
called Third World, as nations seek security by rallying to trusted val-
ues, customs, and institutions, frequently in counterpoint to their writ-
ten promises and international pledges.
Foreign policy must be made today in a welter of ambiguities. The
human rights vocabulary is not acceptable at face value in our times,
and the same holds for the classical language of the state system and
international law. While we in the West continue to cling to our tradi-
tional distinction between peace and war when we estimate our own or
another state's security needs, Communist and most non-Communist,
51. Department Discusses the Human Rights Situation in the Republic of Korea, supra
note 49, at 309.
Vol. 9:40, 1982
Human Rights and National Security
non-Western nations, by contrast, subscribe to the proposition that war
and peace are interpenetrating. Indeed this is what has come to mark
the world environment today.
The focus of American decision-making with regard to friendly
states that derogate from international legal commitments to respect
political rights should be where it was in 1975 when the State Depart-
ment expressed itself as follows:
[i]n view of the widespread nature of human-rights violations in the
world, we have found no adequately objective way to make distinctions of
degree between nations. This fact leads us, therefore, to the conclusion
that neither the United States security interest nor the human rights cause
would be properly served by the public obloquy and impaired relations
with security-assistance recipient countries that would follow the making
of inherently subjective United States Government determinations that
"gross violations do or do not exist" or that a "consistent" pattern of such
violations does or does not exist in such countries. 52
52. N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1977, at A3, col. 2 (quoting State Department memorandum
prepared in late 1975).
